Office – Falling Light Cover & HSE

July 31, 2008

As the lighting cover falls off the ceiling, I was wondering how such an incident would be handled in the oil and gas industry:

  • Filling out a near miss incident report.
  • Reading out the incident in the morning meeting.
  • Incorporate any lessons learnt about the incident (redundancy? Better designed support bars?).
  • Tabulated in whatever incident database exists, to be inserted into the yearly HSE report.

At the office what happens is:

  • Building maintenance comes round, re-installs the light (matter of a push, and pressing the spring loaded tongues in), leaves.
  • No lessons learnt

Did I say that the same thing had happened a month ago? Different light fixture.


And Now for Something Different

July 30, 2008

Sorry, it’s been a busy week, and been kinda distracted from updating this blog. In the interim, enjoy the photos I took last weekend.


IChemE 2nd regional safety seminar – Part IV

July 28, 2008

Continuing on the same topic above, a presentation was delivered by Ir Abdul Malik bin Alias, engineering manager, DPS Bristol (M) Sdn Bhd entitled ‘DPS – Process Safety for FPSO design.’

  • Agenda
    • Safety Strategies
    • Inherent Safety Concept
    • FPSO Inherent Safety Concept
  • Safety strategies (in order of decreasing reliability and robustness)
    • Inherent
    • Passive
    • Active
    • Procedural
  • Inherent Safety
    • Eliminate hazard
      • built-in safety
  • Passive safety
    • Control hazard
  • Active safety
    • Control hazard
  • Procedural safety
    • Control with operational actions.
  • Inherent safety (methods of implementation)
    • Eliminate of minimise
    • Substitute
    • Moderate
    • Simplify

IChemE 2nd regional safety seminar – Part III

July 26, 2008

Continuing on the same topic above, a presentation was delivered by Ir Harminder Singh, ex director-general, DOSH entitled ‘CICM-Responsible care initiative – its development and challenges.’

  • Developments in responsible care
  • Implementation
    • CEOs commitment to 10 guiding principles & code of management practice
  • Responsible care codes at a glance.
  • Milestones
    • Responsible care names and logos.
    • Responsible care awards.
    • Mentor mentee program.
    • Responsible care for SMEs.
    • Working group for safe transport of chemicals.
    • Code of management practice for security.
    • New responsible care management systems.
  • Implement “Policy-Plan-Do-Check-Act” process.
  • International developments in the chemicals industry.
    • Elements of responsible care global charter.

Faraday cage for your laptop?

July 25, 2008

We’ve all heard about how people can detect laptops left in cars, even if you keep them out of sight in your car boot. I guess the only way they perform this detection is if they are picking up a unique resonance frequency from a radio circuit on the device. The most widely installed device with such a circuit is your wireless chip (does this mean that old, pre-wifi era laptops are more secure?). I suppose that if you had a tv tuner card or bluetooth, that could provide a resonance frequency as well.

Wifi operates at 2.4 GHz (125mm), so you could probably build one out of standard metal mesh to place your laptop in, making it invisible to RF scanners.

Alternatively, buy a ready-made bag here.


Need help – Sizing Slug Control Valves

July 24, 2008

Anyone know how to size slug control valves? What I can figure out is this:

  • Only applicable for multiphase flow and where you predict slugs will appear, ex. upstream of your slug catcher.
  • Steady state case, you want the valve fully open, if not you would be wasting energy throttling when it is not required. So, maybe you want to design a valve with 50 kPa pressure drop at 100% opening? I label this case N, for normal.
  • If your design has included sufficient room to handle a slug (ex. between NLL and LAHH), I suppose you wouldn’t need to include a slug control valve.
  • During the throttling phase, you assume the inlet stream is 100% liquid. What flowrate do you want to throttle to? Would it be the vessel design liquid flowrates? Or since the vessel design flowrates assume that liquid dump valve at 80% opening, do I use the maximum flow at 100%?
  • If you take the vessel design flowrate, what upstream pressure would you use? If you use the steady state pressure, doesn’t it make the required Cv for this case (call it S1, for slugging case 1) smaller than that required for N?
  • If you are using the results of a dynamic simulation, how would you interpret the results to use as your slug control valve design case? The reports I’ve seen give the slugging conditions, and I don’t know how they will change if the slug control valve throttles the slug. The upstream pressure on the valve must be higher than without it, but by how much?
  • Another sizing case is where you assume the inlet is 100% gas. However, I don’t think you do include this in the sizing case, as you would assume the flare control valve on the vessel would manage the vessel pressure.

IChemE 2nd regional safety seminar – Part II

July 23, 2008

Continuing on the same topic above, a presentation was delivered by Damain Peake, Sr Technical Safety Engineer, Shell E&P Asia Pacific entitled ‘Shell – Asia Pacific (EPA) operationalises HSE cases: major hazards communication and technical integrity’

  • Shell E&P AP portfolio.
  • Asset Integrity – Definitions
  • Technical Integrity – Definitions
  • Introduction to Safety Cases
    • Show all that hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified, their risks have been evaluated and measures have been taken to control them.
  • Issues
    • Focus: SC used to capture all hazards, not just causes of major accidents.
    • Usability: SC unwieldy due to too much info.
    • Upkeep of SC, Management of Change (MOC)
    • Consistency of SC structure.
  • Framework to address Issues
  • Operationalise Shell E&P AP SCs.
    • Operating envelope and SC agreement
    • Institute maintenance schedule
    • MAH identified
    • Compliance to ALARP principles
    • Accountability
    • Remedial action plan and progress tracking
  • SC HSE section structure
    • Overview
    • Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
    • Equipment
    • Systems
    • Additional information
  • Best Practices
    • MAH and assessments
      • Best Practice Bow Tie – templates, electronically distributed and linked.
    • Hazard / Safety Critical Element (SCE) communication
      • Hazard control sheets.
      • Major accident pictures.
      • KPIs.
    • SCE and technical integrity
      • Change from facility description to SCE description
      • Describe how to keep the SCE operating.
      • Clear guidelines on how to manage SCEs when not fully functional.
  • Take home messages
    • Process safety – asset integrity (AI) intrinsically linked.
    • In operations, MAH management can only be ensured if technical integrity is ensured.
    • Operations HSE case have 3 main functions: communication, linkages, …
    • HSE lose focus.